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These are not happy times for many of the participants in the mortgage
finance market. As the other articles in this symposium describe,' a substantial
number of borrowers, mortgage loan originators, financial institutions, other
lenders, investment bankers, government-sponsored enterprises (Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)), and investors have faced and continue to
face financial hardship, insolvency, and bankruptcy. The current mortgage
market crisis has generated criticism from various parts of the mortgage finance

* Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
A.B. 1968, Princeton University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland. I have benefitted both
professionally and financially serving as issuer's counsel and bankruptcy counsel for
securitizations as a partner with Kutak Rock LLP from 1987 to 1994, as bankruptcy counsel for
securitizations as a consultant for Kutak Rock from 1994-2001, and as Of Counsel to McKee
Nelson LLP since 2001.
1. Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion of Empowerment?,
60 S.C. L. REV. 573 (2009); Raymond H. Brescia, Part of'the Disease or Part of'the Cure: The
Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617 (2009); John Patrick
Hunt, One Cheer fbr Credit Rating Agencies: How the Mark-to-Market Accounting Debate
Highlights the Case./br Rating-Dependent Capital Regulation, 60 S.C. L. REV. 749 (2009); Gerald
Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath o" the Subprime and Mortgage Financing
Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727 (2009); Brian M. McCall, Learning.from Our History: Evaluating the
Modern Housing Finance Market in Light of Ancient Principles f Justice, 60 S.C. L. REV. 707
(2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Understandingthe Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549
(2009); Samuel C. Waters, A View.from the Trenches: The Legal Practitionerand Loss Mitigation,
60 S.C. L. REV. 807 (2009); Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying FairLending Laws
to Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing,60 S.C. L. REV. 677 (2009).
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market and many demands for reform. Some reforms are necessary and can be
useful. There is a danger, however, that other reforms will harm the mortgage
finance market in ways that will ultimately harm future homebuyers.
Any useful reforms in the mortgage finance market will require a sound
analysis of the many different contributing causes of the current crisis. Is the
current crisis the result simply of greedy mortgage loan originators, investment
bankers, and rating agencies? Defrauded, gullible, or crooked borrowers?
Gullible or lazy investors? Lax regulation? Excessive promotion of affordable
housing? Or is the current crisis the result of a sustained period of too-low
interest rates that created a real estate bubble that enticed all participants in the
mortgage finance market-borrowers, originators, investment bankers,
investors, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-to follow the siren call of quick
profits and quick accumulation of wealth? The various proposals for reform will
most likely reflect both the proposers' views of the causes of the current crisis
and their degree of faith in the efficacy of free markets or market regulation.
But such proposals also must take into account another significant underlying
factor.
A significant fundamental factor underlying the current, as well as past,
mortgage finance market crises is the failure of policymakers to understand and
take into account the nature and characteristics of the mortgage loan as an item
of property and, to a lesser extent, the nature of mortgage loan transactions. It is
a truism-often honored in the breach-that any regulatory regime should
reflect the nature of the property and transactions being regulated. 3 When
regulatory regimes, like the current provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code governing true security interests in tangible personal
property, reflect the nature of the property and transactions being regulated,4

2. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 1,passim (arguing that a "market liquidity provider"
could prevent future financial crises by stabilizing a panicked market).
3. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Assignment o1 Receivables Under Article 9: Structural
Incoherence and Wastehll Filing, 68 0111 ST. L.J. 231, 270-71 (2007) (concluding that distinct
property items require different regulatory regimes).
4. In the case of receivables-rights to payment-Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code has been less successful in part because of the failure to appreciate the nature of these
intangible personal property items. See, e.g., id. at 232, 238, 249 (citations omitted) (criticizing
Article 9's use of a "lien" paradigm that rightly assumes that the "debtor" retains title to the
personal property, subject to a security interest, and can therefore create more than one security
interest in the personal property that it owns for regulating the sale of receivables; criticizing
Article 9's use of terms of security such as "debtor," "secured party," "collateral," "security
interest," and "security agreement" to include the seller, the buyer, the receivables sold, the
ownership interest, and the sale agreement; and also criticizing Article 9's filing requirement for
the assignment of receivables); Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of1'
Accounts and Chattel Paper Under the U.C.C. and the ERffcts of" Violating a Fundamental
Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. REV. 397, 452-61 (1994) (criticizing the use of misleading
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they are successful. The 150 years of previously unsatisfactory attempts to
create an efficient regulatory regime for security interests in tangible personal
property-many based on the model of security interests in real propertyillustrate the costs 5of the failure to recognize and take into account the nature of
personal property.
A significant characteristic of the single family mortgage loanpredominantly, a level payment amortizing loan with a thirty-year maturity 6-is7
the fact that, in the hands of the owner of the loan, the loan is a long-term asset.
Accordingly, any owner of mortgage loans must be able to finance this longterm asset through long-term debt financing or other long-term liabilities. The
mortgage loan also has other characteristics-the monthly payment of principal
in small but continuously increasing amounts and the unpredictable prepayment
before maturity-that present additional challenges for any owner of mortgage
loans that seeks to match its long-term liabilities with long-term assets that may
prepay.
Sound financing of any viable enterprise requires that the enterprise match
its assets and its liabilities, and the history of the mortgage finance market in the
United States has demonstrated the unhappy results for enterprises that attempt
to finance long-term assets with short-term liabilities. 9 Specifically, a significant
factor contributing to the mortgage market crisis of the Depression of the 1930s
was the predominant use of short-term mortgage loans, which typically required
no amortization or only partial amortization and a balloon payment due in three
to six years, to finance housing-a long-term asset. 10 Beginning in the early
1930s, Congress responded to this problem by enacting legislation that
encouraged the development of long-term amortizing mortgage loans.1I
Unfortunately, the regulatory regime that created long-term mortgage loans
simply moved the problem up one level because it provided for the financing of
these long-term mortgage loans through very short-term financing-the use of

defined terms to incorporate the sale of accounts and chattel paper under the pre-2001 revisions of
Article 9 and describing the many drafting errors in Article 9 resulting from such use).
5. See generally I GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 1.16.8.2, at 5-195 (1965) (discussing the history and development of independent security devices).
6. See infra text accompanying note 29.
7. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2004) (discussing the use of loan proceeds to "originate more
receivables").
8. See id.
9.
For a discussion of the risks that loan originators must assume, see id. at 1661-62.
10.

See WILLIS R. BRYANT, MORTGAGE LENDING: FUNDAMENTALS AND PRACTICES 17-19

(2nd ed. 1962).
11. See id. at 19-20.
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deposits of savings and loan associations. 12 This regulatory regime finally
exploded in the savings and loan associations crisis of the3 1970s and 1980s
when the entire savings and loan industry became insolvent.,
Congress, the regulatory authorities, and the market responded to this crisis
and this faulty regulatory regime by creating the public securitization of
mortgage loans by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and by creating the private
securitization of mortgage loans by mortgage originators and investment
bankers.14 Unfortunately, the regulatory structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac encouraged them to engage in the risky business of buying higher yielding
mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities and financing those purchases
through shorter-term, lower-rate debt that carried the implicit guarantee of the
United States government. 15 In addition, investment bankers and lenders also
held significant amounts
of mortgage-backed securities that they financed with
6
debt.'
shorter-term
The collapse of the riskier mortgage-backed securities and of the real estate
values underlying many mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities caused
a severe decline in the market value of the mortgage loans and the mortgagebacked securities held by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, financial institutions,
investment banks, and others.' This decline led to the conservatorship of
Fannie Maeis and Freddie Mac, 19 the extinguishment of Bear, Steams & Co., 2 0
acquisition of the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank by JPMorgan

12.

See Kenneth E. Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 BuS. LAW. 1883, 1885

(1990).

13.
14.
15.

See infta text accompanying notes 70-79.
See infta text accompanying notes 80-87.
See infta text accompanying notes 104-09.

16. See GLOBAL JOINT INITIATIVE TO RESTORE CONFDENCE IN THE SECU RITIZATION
MKTS., RESTORING CONFDENCE IN THE SECU RITIZATION MARKETS 5 (2008), available at

http://www.sifma.org/capital-markets/docs/Survey-Restoring-confidence-securitizationmarkets.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Henry M. Paulson Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Remarks on the Role of
the GSEs in Supporting the Housing Recovery Before the Economic Club of Washington (Jan. 7,
2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hpl345.htm (discussing how investors
lost confidence in mortgage-backed securities as real estate values began to fall in 2007, resulting
in a drop in stock prices).
18. In re Conservatorship of Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n. (Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency Sept. 18,
2008) (notice regarding determination and appointment of Federal Housing Finance Agency as
conservator for Fannie Mae), available at http://www.otheo.gov/media/fnm/legalfilings/
NoticeregardingconservatorFNMA.pdf.
19. In re Conservatorship of Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency
Sept. 18, 2008) (notice regarding determination and appointment of Federal Housing Finance
Agency as conservator for Freddie Mac), available at http://www.otheo.gov/media/fre/legalfilings/
NoticeregardingconservatorFILMC.pdf.
20. See Robin Sidel, et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise o(f
Bear
Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at Al.
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21
Chase Bank, 21 the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 22 the
absorption of Wachovia Corporation into Wells Fargo, 23 the absorption of
Merrill Lynch & Co. S•into25
Bank of America Corp.,24 and the demise of many
mortgage-loan originators .
Consequently, future regulation of the mortgage market must reflect the
nature of the mortgage loan. In particular, if the federal government continues to
play a significant role in assisting the financing of the mortgage market, as is
most likely, any federal program must take into account the necessity for
providing for the long-term financing of mortgage loans. A program in which
the federal government simply purchased mortgage loans and held them to
maturity would most likely satisfy this criteria. This model would not, in my
view, be desirable. A better model is the current guarantee programs of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, but without the current ability of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to purchase loans and mortgage-backed securities and to finance
them with short-term debt.
Other reform proposals that help make the mortgage finance market more
efficient should be enacted. For example, regulations that enable borrowers to
understand the terms and risks associated with their mortgage loans are
desirable, and elimination of the application of the holder in due course doctrine
to consumer borrowers-but not commercial entities-is probably desirable.26

21. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations
of Washington Mutual (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/
pr08085.html.
22. In re Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP), 2008 WL 4902202 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2008).
23. Wells Fargo & Co. (Fed. Reserve Bd. Oct. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders2OO8101 2a l.pdf.
24. Bank of America Corp., 2008 WL 5158247, at *1 (Fed Reserve Bd. Nov. 26, 2008),
availableat http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20081012al .pdf.
25. See, e.g., Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007 HMDA Data, FED. RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve
Bd., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 23, 2008, at A107-10 (noting that 169 lending institutions that reported
data under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 2006 ceased lending operations because of
bankruptcy or otherwise); Ben Rooney, Three Regional Banks Fail, CNNMoNEY, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/0l/30/news/economy/failed-banks/index.htm (noting the failure of six
banks in January 2009).
26. See, e.g., Celeste M. Hammond, PredatoryLending-A Legal Definition and Update, 34
REAL EST. L.J. 176, 200 (2005) (discussing the immunity that a holder in due course has from the
claims and defenses that a mortgagor would have against an originator). Consumer borrowers will
generally not be aware of the ramifications of signing a negotiable instrument, which is the
standard document that evidences a single-family mortgage loan. On the other hand, elimination of
holder in due course status would likely increase the interest rates on mortgage loans. See, e.g.,
Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 510 (2002) ("A traditional law and economics
analysis contends that abolishing the holder in due course doctrine would increase interest rates
and fees to borrowers because it would make collection from borrowers less certain and more
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On the other hand, other types of "reform"-such as banning prepayment
penalties, imposing limits on interest rates, imposing other limitations on
mortgage loans, increasing the delay in foreclosing mortgage loans, banning or
limiting the types of mortgage loans that borrowers can enter into, imposing
onerous duties on mortgage originators, and imposing liability on purchasers of
mortgage loans for the acts of originators beyond the amount of the mortgage
loan-do not address the fundamental problem of the long-term nature of
mortgage loans but may make mortgage loans more expensive and less
available to families of limited or moderate income or resources.
1I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MORTGAGE LOAN

The owner of a mortgage loan, like the owner of any payment obligation,
has the benefits and burdens of ownership. 27 The specific benefits and burdens
derive from the nature of the mortgage loan, and the specific characteristics of a
mortgage loan affect the value of the loan. 2 8 Although the long-term amortizing
mortgage loan provided a method for financing residential real estate-a longterm asset-it also introduced its own set of problems. For the last twenty-five
years, the typical residential mortgage loan has been a thirty-year fixed-rate loan
requiring a level monthly payment of principal and interest. 2 9 The payment
amount is determined mathematically to ensure that the principal is fully paid

expensive."). Nevertheless, purchasers of mortgage loans are probably better able to police shoddy
work by originators than consumer borrowers. See id. at 607-08. In this regard, although I disagree
with most of what Professor Kurt Eggert says about securitization, I believe he makes a good case
for the elimination of the holder in due course doctrine. See id. at 607-14. Commercial borrowers
and assignors of mortgage loans, however, should still be subject to the limitations on liability that
the holder in due course doctrine gives to good faith purchasers of mortgage notes. See id. 611-12.
27. See Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO.
MASON U. L. REV. 287,294-302 (1991).
28. See, e.g., id. at 296-98 (describing how benefits and burdens reflect a property's
characteristics, which in turn affect an ownership party's right to the future increase in the market
value of the loan).
29. Adjustable-rate conventional mortgage loans annually averaged (on a unweighted basis)
26% of all loans originated from 1982 through 2005. See FED. HOUS. FIN. BD., TABLE 9: TERMS
ON CONVENTIONAL SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGES, ANNUAL NATIONAL AVERAGES, ALL HOMES,

available at http://www.thtb.gov/ (follow "Reporting" hyperlink; then follow "Monthly Interest
Rate Survey" hyperlink; then follow "Historical Summary Tables" hyperlink; then follow "Table
9" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). In only three years did the percentage of adjustable-rate
mortgages exceed 50%: in 1984, 1985, and 1988, when mortgage interest rates averaged
approximately 12%, 11%, and 9%, respectively. See id. From 1997 through 2004, at least 75% of
all fixed-rate loans were thirty-year loans. Id. at TABLE 28, available at http://www.thtb.gov/
(follow "Reporting" hyperlink; then follow "Monthly Interest Rate Survey" hyperlink; then follow
"Historical Summary Tables" hyperlink; then follow "Table 28" hyperlink (table is incorrectly
denoted as Table 20)) (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
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by the maturity date.:3 Accordingly, each monthly payment includes a principal
payment, in an amount that initially is small but that grows gradually, and an
interest payment, in an amount that initially is large but that declines
gradually. 3 1 For example, a thirty-year mortgage loan in the amount of $100,000
bearing interest at the rate of 6% per annum will have a monthly payment of
$599.55, with a final payment of $600.08 in month 360 to fully amortize the
mortgage. Table 1 illustrates how the principal and interest components change
over time.
TABLE 1: MONTHLY AMORTIZATION

(as of the beginning of each month and the last month of each year)

Year

Outstanding
Balance

Monthly
Interest Payment

1

0

$100,000.00

$500.00

$99.55

2

0

$99,900.45

$499.50

$100.05

3

0

$99,800.40

$499.00

$100.55

4

0

$99,699.85

$498.50

$101.05

5

0

$99,598.80

$497.99

$101.56

6
7

0
0

$99,497.25
$99,395.18

$497.49
$496.98

$102.06
$102.57

8

0

$99,292.61

$496.46

$103.09

Month

Monthly
Principal Payment

9

0

$99,189.52

$495.95

$103.60

10

0

$99,085.92

$495.43

$104.12

11
12

0
0

$98,981.80
$98,877.16

$494.91
$494.39

$104.64
$105.16

60

5

$93,188.00

$465.94

$133.61

120

10

$83,866.03

$419.33

$180.22

180

15

$71,292.09

$356.46

$243.09

240

20

$54,331.72

$271.66

$327.89

300

25

$31,454.73

$157.27

$442.28

360

30

$597.09

$2.99

$597.09

30. See Thomas E. Plank, Toward a More Efficient Bankruptcy Law: Mortgage Financing
Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 641, 642 (2007).
31. See id. at 642-43.
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As Table 1 shows, the owner of a mortgage loan receives an amount of
principal each month for the life of the loan. Accordingly, the owner of the
mortgage loan should be an institution that has the ability to reinvest this
principal each month. 32 In addition, this receipt of monthly principal directly
contrasts with the typical United States Treasury note or bond, and most
corporate and state and local government bonds, which provide
for periodic
33
maturity.
at
payment
principal
one
only
but
interest
of
payment
Another significant feature of a mortgage loan is that it is prepayable by the
borrower: either voluntarily if the borrower sells the house or refinances the
mortgage loan or involuntarily if the borrower defaults. Accordingly, unlike a
United States Treasury note or bond and many corporate and state and local
government bonds, the ultimate payment of principal on any mortgage loan is
unpredictable. 34 This lack of predictability imposes risks on the owner of the
loans and is therefore a cost that the lender must recoup through the interest rate
on the loan, through prepayment penalties, or through make-whole premiums.
Investors in a pool of mortgage loans attempt to predict when they will
receive principal by estimating the speed at which the mortgage loans in the
pool will prepay. 5 These speeds, however, change as market conditions
change. 36 Table 2 illustrates how different prepayment rates affect the final
payment date for a pool of $100,000,000 of mortgage loans using a common
formula for prepayments, known as the PSA formula. PSA variously refers to
"prepayment speed assumptions," 37 or the "Public Securities Association,"
which later became the Bond Market Association before merging
into the
3
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). 8
This formula more closely models the rate of prepayments for newly
originated mortgage loans than a constant prepayment rate formula, which is
also used by investors in the mortgage finance market. The constant prepayment
rate assumes prepayment each month, beginning at origination, at one-twelfth of

32. See id. at 643 ("[A]ny holder of a mortgage loan must be equipped to handle these
dribbles of principal.").
33. Id.
34. See id. at 644 (discussing the impact that prepayment has on the value of mortgage loan
pools).
35. See id.
36. See id. (discussing how changing market value and interest rates affect prepayment
rates).
37.

See BOND MKT. ASS'N, AN INVESTOR'S GLIDE TO COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE

OBLIGATIONS 26 (2008), www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/investors-guide-CMOs.pdf.
38. See Linda Lowell & Michael Corsi, Mortgage Pass-Through Securities, in THE
HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 45, 56 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 6th ed. 2006);
SIFMA Welcome to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association,
http://www.sifma.org (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
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an assumed annual rate. 39 The PSA assumes prepayment in the first month at
one-twelfth of 0.2%, in the second month at one-twelfth of 0.4%, with the
percentage increasing each month in increments of 0.2% until the thirtieth
month, and then remaining at 6% per annum. 4 Prepayment rates are then
expressed as a multiple of the PSA. Hence, 100 PSA assumes, beginning with
the thirtieth month, an annual prepayment rate of 6%; 200 PSA assumes an
annual rate of twice this rate, or 12% beginning at the thirtieth month; and 400
PSA assumes an annual rate of four times this rate, or 24% beginning at the
thirtieth month.
TABLE

2: EFFECT OF PREPAYMENTS-$100,000,000
(Multiple OF PSA)

MORTGAGE POOL

Prepayment Rate:
Final Maturity
(months)
Final Maturity
(years)

0 PSA

100 PSA

200 PSA

300 PSA

400 PSA

360.0

179.0

134.0

112.0

97.0

30.0

14.9

11.2

9.3

8.1

The prepayment of 200 PSA represents a reasonably good estimate of the
prepayment rate in the market in a stable environment. Note that, at a 200 PSA
annual prepayment rate, the expected maturity is 11.2 years. Mortgage loans
have traditionally been priced by reference to the ten-year United States
Treasury bond.4'
Another burden of ownership of a mortgage loan is the risk of loss from
default by the borrower. Because real estate secures a mortgage loan, the owner
of the mortgage loan should recover a substantial portion, if not all, of the
amounts due the owner. The amount of the loss depends on several factors.
First, the owner is not likely to recover much more than the value of the

39. See BOND MKT. ASS'N, supra note 37, at 22 ("[Constant Prepayment rate is] [t]he
percentage of outstanding mortgage loan principal that prepays in one year, based on the
annualization of the Single Monthly Mortality (SMM), which reflects the outstanding mortgage
loan principal that prepays in one month."); see also Lowell & Corsi, supra note 38, at 54 ("A
constant prepayment assumption is not realistic.... [A]ssuming constant prepayments is
comparable to assuming that interest rates will remain at current levels.").
40. See BOND MKT. ASS'N, supra note 37, at 26-27; Lowell & Corsi, supra note 38, at 5658.
41. Kenneth J. Thygerson, Capitalizing on the Mortgage Market, 3 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
179, 182(1984).
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underlying residential property subject to the mortgage. Second, the owner is
entitled to interest that accrues but that is not paid as well as the principal
balance of the loan. Accordingly, the longer it takes to foreclose the mortgage,
the greater the owner's loss from the accrual of unpaid interest. Not
surprisingly, the more equity behind the mortgage loan-the lower the loan-tovalue ratio-the lower the potential loss. Not only does the equity provide a
cushion for declines in the market value and foreclosure value of the real estate,
but a greater equity also provides a greater incentive to the homeowner to
attempt to protect the investment and therefore not to default. In any event, the
expected risk of loss from borrower default is built into the interest rate.42 Any
legal developments that increase the costs of foreclosure, including the time to
complete a foreclosure,
will increase
the interest rates that future borrowers
•
43
must pay for future mortgage loans. 3
Table 3 presents hypothetical losses on a pool of $100,000,000 of mortgage
loans that are (1) "conforming" loans that are eligible for purchase by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, 44 (2) "jumbo loans" that would meet the underwriting
criteria of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac but whose principal balance exceeds
the limits for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,4 5 (3) "alt-A" loans for
borrowers that are generally creditworthy but that do not meet the underwriting
criteria of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for any number of reasons,46 and (4)
"subprime" mortgage loans for borrowers who are considered less

42. See 144 CONG. REC. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas) ("Lenders
redistribute bankruptcy debt by charging you and me higher interest rates .... ").
43. See, e.g., Brian M. Heaton, Note, Hoosier Inhospitality: Examining Excessive
ForeclosureRates in Indiana, 39 IND. L. REV. 87, 106 (2005) ("[A]lthough judicial foreclosure is
intended to protect borrowers, lenders could be passing the higher costs of court proceedings to
homeowners in the form of higher interest rates and larger fees. These additional costs make it
more difficult for borrowers to increase equity in their homes, which makes them more susceptible
to default." (citing Karen M. Pence, Foreclosingon Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit,
88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177 (2006)).
44. See, e.g., David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow
PredatoryLending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985,
1010 (2006) (stating that conforming loans are loans which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may buy
because these loans meet the statutorily imposed restrictions on the types of loans these entities
may purchase).
45. See, e.g., id. at 1010 n.164 ("Those loans that comply with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
requirements except for the restrictions on loan amount are typically referred to as 'jumbo'
mortgages." (citing Wayne S. Passmore et al., GSEs, Mortgages Rates, and the Long-Run Efjcts
of Mortgage Securitization, 25 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 215, 218 (2002)).
46. See, e.g., KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SU BPRIME
MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSEs, AND RISK-BASED PRICING 4 (2002), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf ("[Alt-A] borrowers have FICO scores
similar to those in the prime market .... ").
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creditworthy.
The loss percentages set forth below are intended to be
illustrative, but they are within the range of actual losses experienced or
48
expected in the future.
TABLE

3: MARKET VALUE
Effect of Default

CHANGES

Percent of Present Value of $100,000,000
Based on Loan Type:
Conforming

Jumbo Loans

Loss rate

<1.0%

<1.5%

Alt-A
<10.0%

Subprime
<25.0%

Loss (in millions)

<1

<1.5

<10

<25

Although a concern, the risk of loss from borrower default for most
mortgage loans need not be the most significant risk for the owner of mortgage
loans. One of the most significant risks of ownership of mortgage loans-but
also a great opportunity for gain-results from the change in the market value
of the mortgage loan because of post-origination changes in interest rates for
comparable mortgage loans. 49 This risk results primarily from the long-term
nature of the
fixed-rate mortgage loan, but it is exacerbated by the risk of
50
prepayment.

47. See, e.g., id. ("Subprime lenders offer mortgages to people who represent a higher level
of risk than borrowers who meet standard prime underwriting guidelines.").
48. See, e.g., Francis Parisi & Thomas G. Gillis, Standard & Poor's Revises U.S. Subprime,
Prime, and Alternative-A RMBS Loss Assumptions, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGSDIRECT, July
29, 2008, at 2, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/subprime-prime-alta_072908.pdf (providing loss assumptions for prime jumbo loans of 0.32% for 2005 loans, 0.81%
for 2006 loans, and 1.17% for first-half 2007 loans; providing loan assumptions for subprime loans
of 23% for 2006 loans and 27% for first-half 2007 loans; and further providing loan assumptions
for adjustable alt-A loans up to 12.2% for 2006 loans and 15% for first-half 2007 loans). Standard
& Poor's also modified its loss projections for fixed rate alt-A 2006 and 2007 loans to 10.5% and
12.25%, respectively. Jeremy Schneider et al., Criteria Assumptions: Deftiult and Loss
Assumptions .br U.S. Fixed Alt-A RMBS Transactions, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGSDIRECT,
Sept. 25, 2008, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/eu/page.article/
3,2,2,0,1204839908968.html. Projections for alt-A loans originated before 2006 were lower than
10%. Scott Davey et al., Standard & Poor's Revised Deftiult and Loss Curves.fbr U.S. Alt-A
RMBS Transactions, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGSDIRECT, Dec. 19, 2007, at 7-8, available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Dec 19 Alt-A methodology.pdf.
49. See Plank, supra note 30, at 644 ("[M]ortgage loans bear a significant risk of gain or
loss because of changes in market interest rates.").
50. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
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To understand this risk, Table 4 presents hypothetical values for a pool of
$100,000,000 of mortgage loans under different interest rate assumptions. It
assumes the origination of $100,000,000 of mortgage loans bearing interest at a
then market rate of 6% per annum. It then shows how a change of two
percentage points in market mortgage loan rates for comparable loans two years
after the origination of the pool affects the market value of the pool. 51
Table 4 shows that if market interest rates go up two years after origination,
the present value of the outstanding pool goes down. The change would be very
dramatic if the pool did not prepay, as shown in the 0 PSA prepayment column.
The next column, under the 200 PSA prepayment rate, shows what the effect
would be if the pool prepaid at the rate that was assumed when the mortgage
pool was originated-the "pricing speed."
TABLE 4: MARKET VALUE CHANGES
EFFECT OF CHANGES IN INTEREST RATES

(two years later)
Percent of Present Value of $100,000,000
Based on Prepayment Rate:
Market rate

0 PSA

200 PSA

100 PSA

400 PSA

6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

8%
4%

82.0%
125.3%

91.9%
109.3%

89.3%

Change

1

106.3%
1

10.7%

6.3%

Relying on the pricing speed described above to determine the effect of
prepayment, however, is not realistic. When market mortgage rates go up, the

51. For example, between January 1973 and December 1974, effective interest rates
increased from 7.68% to 9.54%. FED. HOUS. FIN. BD., TABLE 17: TERMS ON CONVENTIONAL
SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGES, MONTHLY NATIONAL AVERAGES, ALL HOMES, available at
http://www.thtb.gov/ (follow "Reporting" hyperlink; then follow "Monthly Interest Rate Survey"
hyperlink; then follow "Historical Summary Tables" hyperlink; then follow "Table 17" hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 8, 2009). From January 1978 to January 1982, effective interest rates increased
each January from 9.15%, to 10.28%, to 12.02%, then to 13.57%, and finally to 15.69%,
respectively. Id. Thereafter, over the next five years, interest rates declined to 9.53% in January
1987. Id. In the next two and a half years, interest rates ranged from a low of 9.11% in March and
April 1987 to a high of 10.56% in June 1989. Id. Rates then declined to a low of 6.76% in October
1993, went back up to 8.23% in March 1995, declined to 6.90% by January 1999, went back up to
8.16% in June 2000, and thereafter dropped to 6.93% in September 2001. Id.; see also infra text
accompanying notes 75-79.
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prepayment speeds for outstanding mortgage loans that bear a lower rate
decline. As illustrated by the 100 PSA prepayment column, the decline in the
prepayment speed increases the decline in the present value of the pool, a
decline of 10.7%-or a decline from $100,000,000 to $89,300,000. Further, as
shown in Table 2, the maturity of the mortgage loan pool lengthens from 11.2
years to 14.9 years. On the other hand, if interest rates decline, the present value
of the cash flow from the existing mortgage loans increases, but the decrease in
interest rates gives borrowers a strong incentive to refinance their mortgage
loans at lower rates, and therefore prepayment speeds increase greatly. The
increase in prepayment speeds reduces the increase in value of the mortgage
loans, and therefore the increase is slightly more than 6%.5 2 To the extent that a
drop in interest rates creates faster prepayments, the increase in the value of the
remaining loans will be less, 53 and a drop in interest rates of two percentage
points is likely to increase the prepayment speed to more than 400 PSA.
Hence, the owner of mortgage loans loses more in value from an increase in
market mortgage rates than the owner would gain from a decrease in mortgage
rates. Further, unlike the borrower who may refinance and prepay when market
rates for mortgage loans decline, the owner of the loan does not have the option
of requiring the borrower to prepay the mortgage loan when market rates go
up. 54 In effect, the borrower has a "call option"-which has value-but the
owner of the mortgage loan does not have a comparable "put option." 55 The
potential for loss without a concomitant potential for a similar gain imposes a
cost-the cost of the borrower's call option-on the owner of the mortgage
loan. 56 The owner of the loan must recoup this cost in the interest rate that it
charges or, as is common for commercial loans and corporate debt that is
prepayable, in the form of prepayment penalties, redemption premiums, and
make-whole premiums. 57 Finally, for conforming mortgage loans and jumbo
loans, the expected loss from borrower default as shown in Table 3 (in the range
of less than $1.5 million) is substantially smaller than the loss from changes in
market value shown in Table 4.

52. See supra tbl.4.
53. See Plank, supra note 30, at 644.
54. See Alan L. Feld & Stephen G. Marks, Legal DiJerences Without Economic
Distinctions: Points, Penalties, and the Market/lbr Mortgages, 77 B.U. L. REV. 405, 406 (1997)
("Interest rate motivated prepayments exacerbate interest rate risk, because such prepayments put
the lender on the wrong side of any shift in the interest rates.").
55. A call option is the right of the holder to purchase a property item from the owner for a
"fixed price even if the market rises," and a put option is the right of the owner of a property item
to sell that property item to another party-and thereby require that person to become the owner"at a fixed price even if the market declines." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1127-28 (8 ' ed. 2004).
56. See Plank, supra note 30, at 644.
57. See Camisha Simmons, Lender Drafting Mishaps' Efjbct on Prepayment Premiums and
Other Damages, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2008, at 26, 26.
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Prepayments create an additional risk. To the extent that an owner of loans
has issued debt to finance the purchase of mortgage loans that have a specified
rate, and the owner was relying on the interest payments to service the debt, a
drop in mortgage rates, an increase in prepayments, and a reinvestment of those
prepayments in lower yield assets will reduce the available assets to repay then
outstanding debt issued in a higher interest rate market. 58 In 2006, the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight criticized Fannie Mae for shortcomings
in managing, accounting for, and disclosing this type of risk. 59
One way for owners of mortgage loans to ameliorate the effect of changes
in market interest rates is to shift the risk to borrowers through an adjustablerate mortgage. Table 5 shows how a change in market mortgage rates would
affect the borrower.
TABLE 5: MARKET VALUE CHANGES
EFFECT ON ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES

Loan
Rate

Monthly
Payment

6%

$599.55

8%
4%

$733.76
$477.42

Change

First Month's
Interest
Payment

Change

$500.00

$134.21
($122.13)

$666.67
$333.33

First Month's
Principal
Payment

Change

$99.55

$166.67
($166.67)

$67.09
$144.09

($32.46)
$44.54

This table illustrates some interesting features of a mortgage loan.
Preliminarily, as a matter of mathematics, the higher the interest rate on an
amortizing loan, the lower the initial principal payments and the slower the
reduction of the principal balance by amortization. For example, at the end of
ten years, the principal balance of a 6% loan will amortize to $83,685.81, but
the principal balance of an 8% loan will amortize to $87,725.54-a balance that
is larger by $4,039.73. From the borrower's perspective, however, the more
significant risk is the increase in the monthly payment. Compounding this risk
is the fact that the slower repayment of the mortgage loan results not only in
higher interest payments currently, but also in higher interest rates calculated on
a more slowly reducing (and therefore larger) principal balance. Nevertheless, if
the borrower can afford to make this increased payment, the owner of the

58. See OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
EXAMINATION OF FANNIE MAE 46, 50, 155 (2006), available at http://www.otheo.gov/media/pdft
fnmspecialexam.pdf.
59. See id. at 46-47, 50, 220, 251.
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mortgage loan has successfully
shifted a significant portion of the market value
60
risk to the borrower.
This risk shifting raises two issues. The first issue is whether the borrower
is an appropriate risk taker. In my view, so long as the borrower truly
understands the risk, the borrower should have the option of assuming that risk.
Even though I, as a reasonably well-informed consumer of mortgage loans,
would never take out an adjustable-rate mortgage loan, I would be loathe to
deny that choice to someone else. Having a borrower achieve this level of
understanding may, however, be problematic.
The second issue is whether the borrower can in fact absorb this risk.
61
Because an increase in the mortgage rate could cause the borrower to default,
the owner of the mortgage loan still retains some risk of loss from changes in
market interest rates. On the other hand, if the mortgage rate declines, the
borrower, and not the owner of the mortgage loan, receives the benefit. 62 To
solve for the risk of default from payment shock, the originator must underwrite
63
the mortgage loan under an assumption of a higher than expected interest rate.
Finally, although this discussion has focused on the effect of changes in
mortgage market interest rates on the value of mortgage loans, the value of
mortgage loans can change dramatically for other reasons, including regulatory
changes such as moratoria on foreclosures or a change in the Bankruptcy Code
that would permit modification of single-family residential mortgage loans.
Further, as the current market illustrates, the market value of mortgage loans
can change when buyers and investors lose faith in mortgage loans
64 because of
the decline in the real estate value underlying the mortgage loans.

60. This shifting is not necessarily complete. For example, there may be a lag time for the
change in the mortgage rate to catch up with current market mortgage interest rates. Further,
adjustable interest rate mortgage loans may adjust on the basis of different indices that do not
necessarily correlate with other floating-rate indices. Also, for the sake of simplicity, this
discussion also ignores the different variations of adjustable-rate mortgage loans, such as the use of
teaser rates followed by higher rates, or variations in the same loan on time of adjustment.
61. Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at
the Consumer Bankers Association 2007 Fair Lending Conference: The Challenges Facing
Subprime Mortgage Borrowers (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/kroszner2007 1105a.htm.
62. See, e.g., Michael Bykhovsky, Overview of Recent Prepayment Behavior and Advances
in Its Modeling and Valuation, in T-E HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, supra
note 38, at 535, 546-47 (discussing how many financially astute borrowers choose ARM loans in
hopes of refinancing at a lower fixed rate when mortgage rates decline).
63. See Anand K. Bhattacharya et al., An Overview of Mortgages and the Mortgage Market,
in TE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, supra note 38, at 3, 5.
64. See, e.g., Tom Petruno, When Faith Is Frayed, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at Al
(discussing the correlation between the declining housing market and the falling value of
mortgage-backed securities in May 2008).
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THE LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOAN AND THE MARKET

The development of the long-term amortizing mortgage loan responded to
the problems created by using short-term mortgage loans to finance long-term
real estate. 65 Unfortunately, financial institutions financed many of these
amortizing mortgage loans with short-term deposits. This system worked
reasonably well when interest rates were stable, 66 and I have heard it called the
"3-6-3" system: the savings association borrowed money from its depositors at
3%, the savings association lent money to homeowners at 6%, and the owners
and officers were on the golf course by 3 p.m. The system, however, was
vulnerable to increases in interest rates or other market conditions that would
cause depositors-who were providing very short-term financing-to withdraw
their deposits. 67 The film, It's a Wonderfid Life, in which Jimmy Stewart played
George Bailey, the operator of the Bailey Brother's Building & Loan, illustrates
the risk. 68 When depositors feared for their deposits, they sought withdrawals of
cash that the savings institution did not have, and George's primary defense was
to explain that the depositors' money was not in69 a safe in the back of the
building but was tied up in their neighbors' homes.
This system came under stress in the 1960s because of inflation and higher
market interest rates. 70 Reliance on short-term loans to finance long-term
financial assets is problematic for two reasons. First, by their nature, interest
rates on short-term financing change quickly. In the 1970s and 1980s, savings
associations had to pay higher rates to depositors to keep their deposits, in many
cases higher than the interest that their existing portfolio of mortgage loans was
paying.7 1 Short-term rates increased dramatically during this time. For example,
from April 1971 to April 1973, the prime interest rate charged by banks to their
most creditworthy customers ranged between 4.75% and 6.61%. The rate
increased in May 1973, and remained between 7.01% and 12.00% from May
1973 to January 1976. 72 The rate decreased in February 1976 to 6.75%, and

65. See supra text accompany notes 6-13.
66. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Economic Symposium: Housing, Housing
Finance, and Monetary Policy (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke2007083 1a.htm (discussing the success that lenders had in financing
long-term loans with short-term deposits before the savings and loan associations crises).
67. See Scott, supra note 12, at 1885-86; Bernanke, supra note 66.
68. IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (RKO Radio Pictures 1946).
69. Id.
70. See Scott, supra note 12, at 1887; Bernanke, supra note 66.
71. Scott, supra note 12, at 1885, 1887; Bernanke, supra note 66.
72. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., AVERAGE MAJORITY PRIME RATE
CHARGED BY BANKS ON SHORT-TERM LOANS TO BU SINESS, QUOTED ON AN INVESTMENT BASIS,
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remained under 10% until November 1978, when the interest rate hit 10.94%
and stayed above 10% until May 1985, going above 20% in several months in
1980 and 1981. 73 Savings institutions holding 7% loans originated in the earlier
1970s were not earning enough to74 pay depositors a competitive short-term rate
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Second, the increase in market interest rates caused the present value of
their assets to decline, as illustrated by Table 4 above. For example, the average
rate on thirty-year fixed-rate conventional mortgage loans from April 1971 to
March 1973 fluctuated between 7.29% and 7.70%. 75 Thereafter, through
October 1978, mortgage rates increased from 7.54% to 9.86% until they reached
10.11% in November 1978, 11.09% in July 1979, 12.83% in November 1979,
and 16.33% in April 1980.76 The rates went down slightly after that for a few
months, then reached 18.16% in September 1981, and stayed above 12.03%
until November 1985. 77 These rising interest rates for mortgage loans caused a
dramatic decrease in the value of the portfolios of savings institutions holding
7% and 8% loans originated in the earlier 1970s. As a result, by the late 1970s
and early 1980s, many savings institutions became insolvent. Indeed, because
the savings and loan industry concentrated on financing long-term mortgage
79
loans with short-term deposits, the entire industry was insolvent in 198 1.
Since the 1930s, the federal government has played a significant role in
financing single-family mortgage loans. 80 In 1968, the federal government
expanded that role when it created two new entities out of the then-existing

available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/data/Monthly/H15_PRTMENA.txt

(last

visited Mar. 9, 2009).
73. See id.
74. Scott, supra note 12, at 1885, 1887; Bernanke, supra note 66.
75. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONTRACT RATE ON 30-YEAR,
FIXED-RATE
CONVENTIONAL
HOME
MORTGAGE
COMMITMENTS,
available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15/data/Monthly/HI 5MORTG-NA.txt (last visited Mar.
9, 2009).

76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Scott, supra note 12, at 1885, 1887; Bernanke, supra note 66.
79. See Scott, supra note 12, at 1885, 1887; see also Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499
U.S. 554, 556-58 (1991) (involving a transaction to exchange similar packages of mortgage
participation interests pursuant to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board). Cottage
Savings Association exchanged a package of single family mortgage participation interests, with a
face value of approximately $6.9 million, for a package of similar mortgage participation interests
held by four other savings associations. Id. at 557-58. Both packages had a market value of $4.5
million, generating a $2.4 million loss for Cottage Savings for federal income tax purposes. Id. The
Court upheld the deductibility of the loss. Id. at 568.
80. See BRYANT, supra note 10, at 9-13; Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American
Mortgage. The Emergency Home FinanceAct of 1970, Standardizationand the Secondary Market
Revolution, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 766-68 (2005).
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Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae-the Government8 1
National Mortgage Association, or Ginnie Mae, and the new Fannie Mae.
Ginnie Mae, as a federal governmental agency, continued many of the functions
of the former Fannie Mae. Ginnie Mae also could guarantee (backed by the full
faith and credit of the United States Government) mortgage pass-through
certificates, backed by mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing82
Administration (FHA) or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA).
Fannie Mae became a federally chartered corporation authorized to purchase
FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mortgage loans and issue pass-through
certificates backed by those mortgage loans."
In 1970, Congress created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
or Freddie Mac, to assist in creating a secondary market for mortgage loans
through the purchasing of conventional mortgage loans-loans that were not
FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed-and issuing and guaranteeing mortgage passthrough certificates that could be sold in the capital markets. 84 Congress also
broadened Fannie Mae's authority to permit Fannie Mae to purchase
conventional loans that met statutorily prescribed standards, including a limit on
the original principal balance, and to issue mortgage pass-through certificates
backed by these conventional loans. 85 By purchasing mortgage loans and
issuing guaranteed mortgage-backed securities to investors, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, also known as government sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
86
provided a long-term source of financing for originators of mortgage loans.
Finally, beginning in the 1980s, the private securitization
of mortgage loans
87
provided an additional source of long-term financing.
These characteristics explain the dramatic shift, beginning in the 1970s, of
the predominant holders of mortgage loans from savings institutions to Fannie

81. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-448,
§ 801, 82 Stat. 476, 536 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C § 1717(a) (2006)).
82. See id. (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C §§ 1717(a)(2)(A), (b)(1), 1721, 1723(a)
(2006)); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHiP OF TE FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND TE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 17-18
(1996).

83. See § 801, 82 Stat. at 536 (codified as amended at §§ 1717(a)(2)(B), 1719, 1723(b));
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASU RY, supra note 82, at 18.
84. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970, Title II1, Pub. L. No. 91-351,
§§ 301-310, 84 Stat. 451, 451-58 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (2006)); see
generally Carrozzo, supra note 80, at 768-97 (discussing the creation of a secondary market for
conventional mortgages).
85. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 45, 450-51
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006)).
86. See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current
Issues and New Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1384-85 (1991).

87.

See id. at 1380-92.
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Mae, Freddie Mac, and the issuers of private mortgage-backed securities. From
1958 to 1979, savings institutions held more than 50% of all single-family
mortgage loans. Thereafter, the share held by savings institutions declined
significantly, and as of the end of 2006, savings
institutions held only 7.8% of
9
loans.8
mortgage
single-family
first-lien
all
In contrast, by the end of 2006, the GSEs, either directly or through trusts,
held 44.4% of all first-lien single-family mortgage loans, 90 and issuers of
private mortgage-backed securities held 22.7% of all first-lien single-family
mortgage loans. 9 1 From the end of 2006 through September 2008, the principal

88. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1975-1984, at 86 tb.L.218, 11.5 & 12
(2008) [hereinafter FRB 01TSTANDINGS 1975-1984], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/zI/Current/annuals/a1975 -1984.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS

1965-1974, at 86 tbl.L.218, 11.5 & 12 (2008) [hereinafter FRB OUTSTANDINGS 1965-1974],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/Current/annuals/a1965-1974.pdf; BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FINDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES:

ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1955-1964, at 86 tbl.L.218, 11.5 & 12 (2008), [hereinafter
FRB 01TSTANDINGS 1955-1964], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl /Current/
annuals/a1955-1964.pdf. From 1945 through 1957, savings institutions held the largest amount of
mortgage loans, more than 35% from 1945 through 1951, and more than 40% from 1951 through
1957. FRB O1TSTANDINGS 1955-1964, supra, at 86 tb.L.218, 11.5 & 12; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FINDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS

AND OUTSTANDINGS 1945-1954, at 86 tbl.L.218, 11.5 & 12 (2008).
89. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SyS., FLOW OF FINDS ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 2005-2007, at 86 tbl.L.218, 11.5, 12,

22
& 24
(2008)
[hereinafter FRB 01TSTANDINGS
2005-2007],
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/Current/annuals/a2OO5-2007.pdf (using the following
formula, remove the home equity junior liens, a substantial portion of which are not long-term
amortizing mortgage loans: (line 12 minus line 24) divided by (line 5 minus line 22)); see also BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FINDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2004, at 86 tbl.L.218, 11.5, 12, 22 & 24 (2008)

[hereinafter FRB 01TSTANDINGS 1995-2004], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
zl/Current/annuals/a1995-2004.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF
FINDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1985-1994, at

86 tbl.L.218, 11.5, 12, 22 & 24 (2008) [hereinafter FRB OUTSTANDINGS 1985-1994], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/Current/annuals/a1985-1994.pdf; FRB 01TSTANDINGS
1975-1984, supra note 88, at 86 tbl.L.218, 11.5, 12, 22 &24 (collectively evidencing the significant
decline in the percentage of first-lien single family mortgage loans held by savings institutions).
90. See FRB OUTSTANDINGS 2005-2007, supra note 89, at 11.5, 17, 18 & 22 (using the
following formula, remove the home equity junior liens, a substantial portion of which are not
long-term amortizing mortgage loans: (line 17 plus line 18) divided by (line 5 minus line 22)).
91. See id. at 11.5, 19, 22 & 26 (using the following formula, remove the home equity junior
liens, a substantial portion of which are not long-term amortizing mortgage loans: (line 19 minus
line 26) divided by (line 5 minus line 22)). The figures for the GSEs include mortgage loans held
or guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, the Federal Home Loan Board, and the Farmers Home
Administration. See FRB 01UTSTANDINGS 2005-2007, supra note 89, at 80 tbl.210 nl. However,
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amount and percentage of first-lien single-family mortgage loans backing
private securitizations declined to 18.7% because of a lack of confidence in
mortgage-backed securities, 9 2 and the loans held by GSEs, either directly or
through trusts, grew to 51.6%. 93 Nevertheless, the mortgage market will need a
rebound in the private securitization of mortgage loans if there is to exist
significant long-term financing of mortgage loans outside of the federal
government or the GSEs. Interestingly, since 1955, commercial banks
have held
94
between 13% and 17% of first-lien single-family mortgage loans.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase mortgage loans, transfer them to
trusts that issue pass-through certificates that entitle the certificate holders to the
interest on and principal of the mortgage loans, and guarantee the timely receipt
of principal and interest on these certificates. 95 In addition, these GSEs purchase
mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities for their own portfolios and
finance these purchases by issuing unsecured debt.96 Frequently, the aggregate

the holdings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dwarf the holdings of these latter entities. See inrdfa
notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
92. See id. at 11.5, 17, 18 & 22 (using the following formula, remove the home equity junior
liens, a substantial portion of which are not long-term amortizing mortgage loans: (line 17 plus line
18) divided by (line 5 minus line 22)).
93.

See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF

THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND 01TSTANDINGS

THiRD QUARTER 2008,

at

94,

tbl.L.218, 11.5, 19, 22 & 26 (2008) [hereinafter FRB O1TSTANDINGS THiRD QUARTER], available
at http://federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/zl.pdf (using the following formula, remove the
home equity junior liens, a substantial portion of which are not long-term amortizing mortgage
loans: (line 19 minus line 26) divided by (line 5 minus line 22)).
94. See id. at 11.5, 11, 22 & 23 (using the following formula, remove the home equity junior
liens, a substantial portion of which are not long-term amortizing mortgage loans: (line 11 minus
line 23) divided by (line 5 minus line 22)); FRB 01TSTANDINGS 2005-2007, supra note 89, at 11.5,
11, 22 & 23 (same); FRB 01TSTANDINGS 1995-2004, supra note 89, at 11.5, 11, 22 & 23 (same);
FRB O1TSTANDINGS 1985-1994, supra note 89, at 11.5, 11, 22 & 23 (same; however, no
information was collected on second-lien loans until 1990); FRB 01TSTANDINGS 1975-1984,
supra note 88, at 11.5, 11 (no information collected on second-lien loans, which were less prevalent
then); FRB 01TSTANDINGS 1965-1974, supra note 88, at 11.5, 11 (same); FRB 01TSTANDINGS
1955-1964, supra note 88, at 11.5, 11 (same).
95.

See FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR

15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
2007 (FORM 10-K), at 5 (2008) [hereinafter FANNIE MAE, FORM 10-K], available at
http://www.fanniemae.com/ (follow "Investor Relations" hyperlink; then follow "SEC Filings"
hyperlink; then follow "Annual Filings" hyperlink; then follow "PDF" hyperlink for 10-K,
02/27/08).
96.

See

FED. HOME LOAN MORTGAGE

CORP.,

QUARTERLY

REPORT

PURSUANT

TO

SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD

ENDED JUNE 30, 2008 (FORM 10-Q), at 1 (2008) [hereinafter FREDDIE MAC, FORM 10-Q],
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/ (follow "Investor Relations" hyperlink; then follow
"SEC Filings" hyperlink; then follow "Quarterly Filings" hyperlink; then follow "PDF" hyperlink
for 10-Q, 08/06/2008).
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amounts of the guaranteed mortgage-backed securities and this unsecured debt
are lumped together. For example, the statement of the Director of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) on September 7, 2008, announcing the
appointment of the FHFA as the conservator of both Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac stated that "the Enterprises have $5.4 trillion of guaranteed mortgagebacked securities (MBS) and debt
outstanding, which is equal to the publicly
97
held debt of the United States."
The difference between the two types of obligations may not be significant
either from the perspective of investors that hold highly rated mortgage-backed
securities guaranteed by a GSE or direct debt issued by a GSE and that need
timely payment of the principal and interest on their investments, or from the
perspective of the reputation of the GSEs. There are, however, significant
differences between the two that dramatically affect the operations of the GSEs.
In the case of the guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, the GSEs retain only
the risk of loss. 98 Accordingly, for every $100 billion of mortgage-backed
securities guaranteed by the GSEs, the GSEs' liability is a tiny percentage of
that amount-probably less than 1%, or $1 billion. 99 The GSEs cover this risk
by collecting a guarantee fee in the range of an annual rate of 0.25% of the
principal balance of the mortgages underlying the securities, and this fee has
generally been sufficient to cover the expected losses. 100

97.
James B. Lockhart, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Dir. James B.
Lockhart (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.otheo.gov/media/statements/FfIFAStatement
9708.pdf.
98.
See, e.g., Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure ofa Government-Sponsored
Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 575 (2005) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ASSESSING THE
PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 5 (1996), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/0xx/docl3/Fanfred.pdf) ("The guarantee entails modest credit risk to
the GSEs arising from the possibility that homebuyers will default on their loans and that the value
of the property will not cover the balance due on the loans.").
99.
See FREDDIE MAC, FORM 10-Q, supra note 96, at 29 tbl.12 (showing that Freddie
Mac's credit loss ratio for the three months ending June 30, 2008, was 0.181% (18.1 basis points)
and for the six months ending June 30, 2008, was 0.151% (15.1 basis points), both less than 1%);
FANNIE MAE, FORM 10-K, supra note 95, at 46 (showing that Fannie Mae's credit loss ratio
between 2003 and 2007 ranged from 0.01% (1.0 basis points) to 0.053% (5.3 basis points), or less
than 1% (100.0 basis points)).
100. See FREDDIE MAC, FORM 10 -Q,supra note 96, at 29 tbl.12 (showing that "[s]inglefamily credit losses, in basis points (annualized)" of 18.1 basis points (or 0.181 %) for the three
months ending June 30, 2008, and of 15.1 basis points (or 0.151 %) for the six months ending June
30, 2008); FANNIE MAE, FORM 10 -K,supra note 95, at 46 & 47 nn. 16, 17 (showing Fannie Mae's
average effective guaranty fee rate between 2003 to 2007 ranged from 0.218% (21.8 basis points)
to 0.237% (23.7 basis points); see also FREDDIE MAC, GLOSSARY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC
TERMS, http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/smm/g-m.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) ("[A
guarantee fee is] compensation charged for undertaking responsibility for another's debt ....
Secondary-mortgage-market companies charge guarantee fees-typically about one-quarter of a
percentage point of the loan amount-for bearing the default risk on loans pooled into securities.").
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On the other hand, the GSEs retain full liability for the debt that they issue.
GSEs use the proceeds of this debt, among other Purposes, to acquire and hold
mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities for which the GSEs retain
full market value risk-not just default or credit risk.l12 Therefore, although the
amount of the GSEs' debt is substantially lower than the amount of their
guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, 103 the GSEs' liability on such debt is
greater than their liability on the guarantees.
For example, as of the end of 2007, Fannie Mae had assets totaling
approximately $883 billion (including approximately $728 billion of mortgages
and mortgage-related securities held in its portfolio), had short- and long-term
debt of approximately $796 billion, and had guaranteed mortgage-backed
securities held by third parties in the amount of over $2.1 trillion., °4 Fannie
Mae's debt equaled about 38% of the principal balance of the guaranteed
mortgage-backed securities, but Fannie Mae's liability on its guarantee would
not exceed 1-2%1105 _substantially less than its liability on its debt. This was a
significant improvement from the end of 2003 when Fannie Mae had assets
totaling approximately $1 trillion (including about $909 billion of mortgages
and mortgage-related securities held in its portfolio), had short- and long-term
debt of $961 billion, had guaranteed mortgage-backed securities held by third
parties in the amount of around $1.3 trillion, and had a ratio of debt to
guaranteed mortgage-backed securities of about 74%.106
Similarly, as of June 30, 2008, Freddie Mac had interest-earning assets
consisting of mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities totaling
approximately $734 billion (not limited to single-family mortgage loans), had
short- and long-term debt of about $776 billion, and had guaranteed mortgagebacked securities held by third parties in the amount of approximately $1.8
trillion.'°7 Its debt equaled about 43% of the principal balance of the guaranteed

101. See FREDDIE MAC, FORM 10 -Q, supra note 96 ("We also purchase mortgage loans and
mortgage-related securities for our retained portfolio. We finance our purchases for our retained
portfolio and manage associated interest-rate and other market risks primarily by issuing a variety
of debt instruments and entering into derivative contracts in the capital markets.").
102. See, e.g., Carnell, supra note 98, at 575-76 (explaining that the GSEs' portfolio
investments represent their greatest risk because they assume the risk that a rise in interest rates
will run down market values of mortgage-backed securities and that a drop in interest rates will
entice borrowers to prepay).
103.

See FANNIE MAE, FORM 10-K, supra note 95, at 46.

104. Id. at 46 & 47 nn.9, 11 (reflecting both the larger single-family mortgage loans and the
much smaller multi-family mortgage loans as well as mortgage-related securities).
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that Fannie Mae had a credit loss
ratio of less than I%).
106. See FANNIE MAE, FORM 10-K, supra note 95, at 46 & 47 nn.9, 11.
107.

See FREDDIE MAC, FORM 10-Q, supra note 96, at 17 tbl.3, 94 tbl.2.1.
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mortgage-backed securities, but Freddie Mac's liability on its guarantee would
108
not exceed 1-2%° _substantially less than its liability on its debt.
Current federal law acknowledges the significant difference between (1) the
GSEs' guaranteed mortgage-backed securities and the loans underlying those
securities and (2) the GSEs' direct debt and the mortgage loan and mortgagebacked securities that the GSEs held in their portfolios. The Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008,109 effective July 30, 2008, created the FHFA0
to replace the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),"
authorized the Director of the FHFA to appoint the FHFA as conservator of the
GSEs," 1 and provides detailed provisions for the rehabilitation of the GSEs.12
The Act expressly provides that any mortgages or mortgage pools held by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in trust for the benefit of other persons are not
available to satisfy claims of creditors of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but will
continue to be held for the benefit of those third parties.'1 3 Accordingly, if either
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were to default on their guarantees of their passthrough certificates, the holders would nevertheless have the rights set forth in
the documents governing those certificates. The holders would continue to
receive payments as set forth in the applicable trust agreements to the extent of
the assets in the related trusts.' 4 If Fannie Mae's or Freddie Mac's obligations
under their guarantees exceeded the available assets of the trusts, the holders
would have an unsecured claim for damages against the defaulting GSE, which
15
would "be estimated in accordance with the regulations of the Director."
Other provisions of the Act also recognize these differences in the two types of
obligations.' 16

108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that Freddie Mac had a credit
loss ratio of less than 1%).
109. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(amending scattered sections of 5, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
110. Id. § 1101, 122 Stat. at 2661-63 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511-4512) (replacing the
OFHEO with the FHFA and replacing the Director of the OFHEO with the Director of the FHFA).
111. Id. § 1145, 122 Stat. at 2734 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(1)).
112. See id., 122 Stat. at 2734-38 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2), (b)(2)(D), (G)-(H))
(authorizing the Director to appoint the FHFA as conservator of a GSE to rehabilitate it, among
other reasons, and authorizing the Agency as conservator to take appropriate actions to restore a
GSE to a sound condition, such as disposing of a GSE's assets or paying a GSE's valid
obligations).
113. Id. § 1145, 122 Stat. at 2746 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(19)(B)(i)) ("Any
mortgage, pool of mortgages, or interest in a pool of mortgages held in trust, custodial, or agency
capacity by a regulated entity for the benefit of any person other than the regulated entity shall not
be available to satisfy the claims of creditors generally .... ).
114. Id., 122 Stat. at 2746-47 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(19)(B)(ii)).
115. Id., 122 Stat. at 2747 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(19)(B)(iii)).
116. For example, the Act mandates that the Director of the FHFA determine criteria
governing GSEs' portfolio holdings to secure the soundness of these holdings and establish risk-
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In the case of the direct debt securities of each GSE, however, the payment
of the entire debt depends on the value of the assets-including the mortgage
loans and the mortgage-backed securities-that the GSE holds in its
portfolio. 117 If the GSE was to become insolvent, the debt holders will receive
payment of only a portion of their debt obligations. 118
The continued deterioration of the mortgage market in 2008 created the
necessary political will to provide for a more robust regulation of the GSEs,
which had been suggested for years. 119 The deterioration of the mortgage
market also exposed the financial weakness of the GSEs' strategy to issue debt
to finance and hold significant portfolios of long-term mortgage loans and
mortgage-backed securities.' Finally, because of concerns about the ability of
the GSEs to pay their direct debt or their guarantee on their guaranteed
mortgage-backed securities, the Director of the FHFA put the GSEs into
conservatorship on September 7, 2008.121 To restore confidence in the GSEs,
the United States Treasury Department provided credit support to each GSE in
the form of (1) a Government Sponsored Enterprise Credit Facility, by which
the Treasury Department will make short-term loans to each GSE to provide
"liquidity if needed until December 31, 2009," secured by guaranteed mortgagebacked securities issued by the GSEs; 122 and (2) a Treasury Senior Preferred
Stock Purchase Agreement with the Treasury Department to ensure that each
GSE maintains a positive net worth.123

based capital levels to ensure that GSEs have sufficient capital to support the liabilities that the
portfolio holdings impose. See id. §§ 1109-1110, 122 Stat. at 2674-76 (amending 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1426, 4611, 4624). In contrast, concerning guarantee fees, the Act only mandates a study of
such fees and a breakdown of risk assessment, but does not mandate any establishment of criteria
over guarantee procedures or require a minimum capital level to make support guarantee liability.
See id. § 1601, 2008 122 Stat. at 2824-25 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4514a).
117. Id., 122 Stat. at 2742-43 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(9)(A)).
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Federal Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2003, S. 1508, 108th Cong.
(2003) (proposing reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
122. Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Government Sponsored
Enterprise Credit Facility (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/gsecffactsheet_090708.pdf.
123. Press Release, Henry M. Paulson Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Statement by
Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to
Protect
Financial
Markets
and
Taxpayers
(Sept.
7,
2008),
available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl 129.htm; see also Amended and Restated Senior Preferred
Stock Purchase Agreement, U.S. Dep't of Treasury-Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Sept. 26,
2008
[hereinafter
Freddie
Mac
Preferred
Stock
Agreement],
available at
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreementfrea.pdf; Amended
and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, U.S. Dep't of Treasury-Fed. Nat'l
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The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement gives the Treasury
Department an "upfront $1 billion issuance of senior preferred stock with a 10%
coupon from each GSE, quarterly dividend payments, warrants representing an
ownership stake of 79.9% in each GSE going forward, and a quarterly fee
starting in 2010."' 124 The Treasury Department is obligated to contribute cash
capital, up to $100 billion to each GSE, "[i]f the Federal Housing Finance
Agency determines that a GSE's liabilities
have exceeded its assets under
S • ,125
generally accepted accounting principles,
in exchange for senior preferred
stock "senior to all other preferred stock, common stock or other capital stock to
be issued by the GSE. ' Each agreement includes several covenants by each
GSE, including covenants (i) that it will not "[i]ncrease its debt to more than
110% of its debt as of June 30, 2008," and (ii) that "[e]ach GSE's retained
mortgage and mortgage backed securities portfolio shall not exceed $850 billion
as of December
31, 2009, and shall decline by 10% per year until it reaches
127
$250 billion."'
These developments illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the
GSEs. The guarantee of mortgage pass-through certificates by an agency with
the implicit backing of the United States Government enabled originators of
mortgage loans to find a long-term source of financing for these long-term
assets. 128 Investors could purchase highly liquid mortgage-backed securities
backed by mortgage loans that had the payment characteristics that matched
their needs and that bore no credit risk. 129 Presumably, these investors could
account for the risk of changes in the market value of these mortgage-backed
securities.
The weaknesses of the GSEs, however, also stem directly from the nature
of mortgage loans and the decision of the GSEs to hold significant portfolios of
longer-term mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities financed through
direct debt issuance. Unlike the savings and loan associations crisis of the 1970s

Mortgage Ass'n, Sept. 26, 2008 [hereinafter Fannie Mae Preferred Stock Agreement], available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/ press/releases/reports/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreementfnm I .pdf;
Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008), http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pspa-factsheet090708hp1 128.pdf [hereinafter Stock Purchase Agreement Fact Sheet].
124. Stock Purchase Agreement Fact Sheet, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. Id. at2.
127. Id.; see also Freddie Mac Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 123, at 9 (describing
indebtedness and mortgage assets covenants); Fannie Mae Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note
123, at 9 (same).
128. See,
e.g.,
Freddie
Mac,
Our
Role
in
the
Secondary
Market,
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company-profile/our role secmkt/index.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2009) (explaining how Freddie Mac provides financing to lenders).
129. See id.
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and 1980s, which was caused by a decline in the value of mortgage loans held
by savings institutions as the result of the increase in market interest rates,' 30 the
financial disaster that befell the GSEs from this strategy resulted from a decline
in the value of their mortgage loans from other causes. 131 Nevertheless, many
commentators
warned that the GSEs' strategy created substantial systemic
132...
risk. 1 Although the risk materialized from the collapse in the market value of
mortgage loans,' 33 the assumption of market value risk through the GSEs' direct
holdings and direct debt issuance jeopardized their ability to provide a source of
long-term financing through their guarantee programs.
The other important source of long-term financing for mortgage loans had
been the private securitization of mortgage loans.134 Instead of relying on an
implicit federal government guarantee, the private securitization of mortgage
loans relies on the legal isolation of a pool of mortgage loans from the operating
risks and, therefore, the bankruptcy risks of an originator. 35 By being isolated
from the bankruptcy risks of an operating company that is the originator or
owner of the loans, private mortgage-backed securities avoid the costs that the
Bankruptcy Code imposes on secured creditors of debtors in bankruptcy. 36 A
significant feature of the Bankruptcy Code is that all debts of the debtor in
bankruptcy become accelerated, a form of involuntarily prepayment that
imposes costs on creditors. 137 By avoiding the risk of bankruptcy of the
originator, mortgage-backed securities do not face the risk of prepayment that
the holders of debt-including secured debt-of an operating company face. 38
In the past year, however, private securitization has suffered from the loss of
confidence in the creditworthiness of the underlying mortgage loans.139 Private
securitization will not return to its former level until the real estate bubble of the
last few years is fully deflated, and investors regain confidence in the real estate
values underlying mortgage loans, in the integrity of the mortgage loan
origination process, and in the integrity of the private mortgage-backed
securities.

130. See supra text accompanying notes 67-79.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 17-25.
132. See, e.g., Bhattacharya et al., supra note 63, at 33 ("The portfolio growth of the [GSEs]
has ... become a fairly thorny political issue, kindling worries that the size of the agency
portfolios creates risks for the stability of the financial markets.").
133. See supra text accompanying note 92.
134. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 86, at 1380-92.
135. See Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal
Structureand a Fanc ifd Critique,30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 622 (2008).

136.
137.
determine
138.
139.

See Plank, supra note 7, at 1660-71; Plank, supra note 135, at 621-23.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2006) ("[T]he court, after notice and a hearing, shall
the amount of such claim ... and shall allow such claim in such amount .....
See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
See supra text accompanying note 92.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Former Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson noted in a speech at the
Economic Club of Washington on January 7, 2009, that many investors "fled
mortgages" (which would include the mortgage-backed securities issued in
private securitizations) that bore any kind of credit risk.' 4 0 Nevertheless, as he
observed, the ability of the GSEs to continue to issue guaranteed mortgagebacked securities enabled the conforming loan market to function relatively
well.141 These developments demonstrate that the guarantee model of the GSEs
could continue to provide an important method for supporting the long-term
financing of mortgage loans. The specific form that the GSEs should take
presents difficult questions, as former Secretary Paulson noted in his speech.142
Should the GSEs simply become federal agencies carrying the guarantee of the
federal government? Should the GSEs be completely privatized? Should they
continue to be quasi-governmental enterprises carrying the implicit backing of
the federal government?
In any event, whatever the shape of the reform of the GSEs and other
reforms of the regulatory regime for the mortgage finance market, the reforms
must take into account the fact that a mortgage loan is a long-term asset and that
owners of mortgage loans either must have matching long-term liabilities or
must finance their holdings with long-term financing. GSEs that provide a
guarantee against default, and therefore eliminate a portion of the risk of
holding long-term assets, can play an important stabilizing function in the
mortgage finance market.

140. Paulson, supra note 17.
141. See id.
142. See id.

